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A central issue in Iraq—as well as the U.S. and other countries—remains
whether the people control government through voting and taxes or the gov-
ernment controls the people through a monopoly on natural resources. To break
that monopoly, the Bush administration and the Iraqi Governing Council have
a momentous opportunity to instate a new paradigm. Only an owner-people can
ensure a prosperous Iraqi state.1
Vernon Smith, Nobel Laureate
Introduction
In an important document2 released toward the end of 2005, the United
States outlined its strategy for victory in Iraq. Victory is defined in states:
(1) Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meet-
ing political milestones, building democratic institutions and indigenous
security forces; (2) Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists
and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in
place and on its way to achieving its economic potential; and (3) Longer
term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable and secure, well integrated into the
international community and a full partner in the war on terrorism.
The U.S. strategy is essentially three pronged: developing democracy,
providing security, and reviving the economy. With the critical December
2005 elections completed, 2006 represents a pivotal year for Iraq. Or, as
noted by Ambassador Khalilzad:
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This will be a year of decision in Iraq. Full participation in the December
national elections by all communities has created the opportunity to signifi-
cantly advance our strategy for success as recently outlined by President Bush.
Building on this momentum is up to the Iraqi people. However, the United
States will work intensively with Iraq’s leaders to make progress on all three
tracks of our strategy: developing democracy, providing security and reviving
the economy.3
In the economic area, U.S. and coalition efforts to date have focused on
helping Iraq restore the country’s neglected and damaged infrastructure in
an effort to restore and expand essential services. Other goals include the
start of market-based economic reforms, and greater transparency and
accountability in the public sector. “The international community has
been instrumental in these efforts, but there is room for the international
community to do more. Foreign direct investment, over time will play an
increasing role in fueling Iraq’s economic growth.”4
The logic of this strategy is straightforward:5
1. The rebuilding of Iraq’s infrastructure and the provision of essential
services will increase the confidence of Iraqis in their government and
help convince them that the government is offering a brighter future.
People will then be more likely to cooperate with the government and
provide intelligence against the enemy, creating a less hospitable envi-
ronment for the terrorists and insurgents.
2. Efforts in the reconstruction realm have significant implications in the
security realm when they focus on rebuilding post-conflict cities and
towns. Compensations for civilians hurt by counterterrorism operations
and the restoration of some economic vibrancy to areas formerly under
terrorist control can help ease resentment and win over an otherwise
suspicious population.
3. Economic growth and reform of Saddam-era laws and regulations will
be critical to ensuring that Iraq can support and maintain the new secu-
rity institutions that the country is developing, attract new investment
to Iraq, and become a full, integrated member of the international
community.
4. Economic growth and market reform—the promotion of Iraq’s private
sector—are necessary to expand job opportunities for the youthful Iraqi
3 Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Challenge Before Us,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2006, A.12
4 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington: National Security Council, November 2005), p. 22.
5 Ibid.
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population and decrease unemployment that makes some Iraqis more
vulnerable to terrorist or insurgent recruiting.
While this strategy has many merits, it is basically a continuation of the
long-term approach taken by Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition
Provisional Government (CPA) in 2003. Subsequent to the release of the
National Development Strategy (NDS), Ambassador Bremer expressed
reservations over the course he set out for Iraq’s economic recovery:
We also placed too much emphasis on large-scale reconstruction projects. While
the urgent need for modern highways, electrical generating plants and the like
was clear, we should have anticipated that building them would take a long
time. Our earlier efforts should have been directed more tightly at meeting
Iraqis’ day-to-day needs.6
Iraqis themselves are increasingly skeptical of the viability of the post-
war economic strategy. Certainly the ability to complete infrastructure
projects on time and within budget has proven to be a nearly impossible
task. As noted by the U.S. Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
infrastructure programs in that country have been plagued by “violence,
corruption and mismanagement.”7 As a result, “the ambitious US recon-
struction effort in Iraq is likely to fall far short of its goals because soaring
security costs and poor management have slashed the amount of American
money available for rebuilding projects.”8 Just as serious is the all too
apparent long lead time before any tangible benefits in terms of improved
living standards are seen by the average Iraqi:
US officials largely measure progress in Iraq in terms of numbers: more than
$14 billion spent so far on reconstruction, or in terms of electricity, the numbers
of kilowatt hours produced by Iraqi power plants. This year (2005) for the first
time, US officials say that the number has surpassed prewar levels. The aver-
age Iraqi measures progress in numbers too: how many hours of electricity he
gets each day before the lights go out. Right now that’s roughly two for every
five hours of blackout.9
Implicit in Ambassador Bremer’s assessment is that the main flaw in the
U.S. strategy has been its inability to deliver short-run economic gains to
6 L. Paul Bremer, “In Iraq, Wrongs Made a Right,” New York Times, January 13, 2006.
7 Quoted in Tom Regan, “US Inspector General for Iraq Paints ‘Grim’ Picture of Reconstruction Effort,”
Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 2005.
8 Ibid.
9 Jamie Tarabay, “Despite Progress, Iraqis Still Face Daily Challenges,” NPR, All Things Considered,
December 20, 2005.
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large segments of the Iraqi population. Unfortunately, the NDS does little
to address this issue and appears content simply continuing the existing
strategy.
On a more fundamental level, other than noting that oil revenues will
assist in financing infrastructure and much of the country’s capital expen-
ditures, the NDS does not explicitly address the role of oil in Iraq’s future.
Yet there is a vast literature suggesting that the oil sector and the allocation
of its revenues is the critical variable in shaping both the economic struc-
ture and political systems of countries like Iraq. For the most part this lit-
erature focuses on the so called “oil curse” or the “paradox of plenty.”10
These colorful phrases capture the gist of oil’s potentially destructive pow-
ers—unless properly managed, oil revenues more often than not under-
mine the economic, political and social fabric of countries, irrespective of
how well intended their long run goals and objectives.
The purpose of the sections that follow is to examine ways in which the
proper management of Iraq’s oil revenues can facilitate that country’s eco-
nomic recovery. In part, this entails not only addressing many of the short-
comings of the country’s current supply-side development strategy, but
also examining whether an alternative demand-oriented approach might
be more likely to succeed in the current Iraqi environment.
Ramifications of oil wealth
As noted above, the political and economic ramifications of oil wealth,
especially in the developing world, have received considerable attention
in recent years.11 In fact, economists have long observed that resource
abundant countries tend to underperform relative to resource deficient
economies. Sachs and Warner,12 for example, provide empirical evidence
that higher levels of oil and mineral dependence tend to reduce a 
country’s rate of economic growth. Similar findings have been obtained 
in a number of subsequent studies.13 Often slow growth stems from
10 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms in Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1997).
11 For an excellent summary of much of this literature, see Svetlana Tsalik, Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will
Benefit? (New York: Open Society Institute, 2003).
12 J. D. Sachs and A. M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” Development
Discussion Paper No. 517a, Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995.
13 See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs, “Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development,”
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 136:4 (2000), pp. 579–600.
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significant declines in productivity experienced by the oil producing
countries.14
Focusing on growth outcomes, Ross15 found that after controlling for
levels of GDP, countries that have higher mineral and oil dependence
(defined as oil and mineral exports relative to GDP) are consistently defi-
cient in the critical areas of child mortality and nutrition, have lower liter-
acy and school-enrollment rates, score lower on the UN Human
Development Index, have larger shares of their population in poverty,
devote a greater share of government spending to military spending, and
are more authoritarian.
In other areas of significance, Looney,16 Leite and Weidman17 and
Glyfaslon et al.18 report that higher oil and mineral dependent countries
exhibit greater corruption. Of particular relevance for Iraq, Collier and
Hoeffler’s work19 suggests they also have a greater probability of civil war
for any given five-year period. There are at least four ways that oil and
mineral dependence tend to promote civil war and conflict, and, unfortu-
nately, all are currently present in Iraq to one extent or another:
1. Slower growth and poverty creates repressed resentment and frustra-
tion, often leading to terrorism and eventually a full-blown civil war.
Much of the present insurgency in Iraq has been attributed20 to that
country’s persistent unemployment rate of 30%–50%.
2. Corruption in government fosters a drive for regime change.
Unfortunately, the prestigious Transparency International has ranked
Iraq as the most corrupt country in the Middle East. As World Bank
President James Wolfensohn noted: “The diversion of funds from pub-
licly financed projects represents an unacceptable tax on the poor. In
the construction sector it represents a deplorable opportunity lost for
14 Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Future: Will Oil Be a Blessing or Curse?” Middle East Business and Economic Review
16:1 (June 2004), pp. 15–29.
15 M. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” World Politics, 51:2 (1997); and M. Ross, “Does Oil
Hinder Democracy,” World Politics, 53:1, April 2001, pp. 325–361.
16 Robert Looney, “Profiles of Corruption in the Middle East,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
30:3 (Fall 2005), pp. 285–303.
17 C. Leite and J. Weidman, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption and Economic
Growth,” IMF Working Paper WP/99/85, 1999.
18 T. Glyfalson, T. Herbertsson and G. Zoega, “A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources and Economic Growth,”
Macroeconomic Dynamics 3 (June 1999), pp. 204–25.
19 P. Coillier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Policy Research Working Paper 2355,
Development Research Group, World Bank 2000.
20 Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National
Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp.67–72.
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the delivery of essential services and it undermines citizen trust in gov-
ernment.”21
3. Authoritarian rule enables one party to gain control of resources and use
them for its own benefit, thereby creating resentment among political
outsiders. The result is often regional secession movements as with the
Kurds under Saddam, and perhaps the current Sunni concerns of a
Shiite/Kurd alliance depriving them of future oil revenues.22
4. Sale of looted natural resources can provide rebel groups with financ-
ing—as exemplified by conflict diamonds, and trade in cocaine and
opium, and of course smuggling and black market oil in Iraq.23
The relevant causal explanations for oil’s destructive effects fall into
three broad and somewhat overlapping categories: the rentier thesis, the
repression thesis, and the rent-seeking thesis.24
According to the rentier state thesis, oil wealth crates weak state–soci-
ety linkages. Specifically, the direct receipt of oil revenues means the state
does not need to represent and monitor social groups for the purpose of
extracting taxes and developing pubic policies that justify the level of tax-
ation. During booms, oil governments tend to rapidly ratchet up expendi-
tures, flooding the domestic economy with excess cash stimulating
inflation pressures. Conversely, sharp declines in oil revenues make it
impossible to continue patronage and the weaknesses of the state bureau-
cracies make it impossible to obtain revenue from other sources.
Significantly, Iraq has very limited non-oil sources of revenues, with 95%
of government revenues coming from the petroleum sector.
Oil states also have unique structures that contribute to the problem.
Unlike agriculture, the oil sector employs few unskilled people. The
inherent volatility of commodity prices hurts the poor the most, as they are
least able to hedge their risks. And because the resource is concentrated,
the resulting wealth passes through only a few hands—and so is more sus-
ceptible to misdirection.
The repression thesis argues that oil wealth keeps the authoritarian
states in power, because wealth is used to strengthen the military and the
21 Quoted in “Iraq Facing Corruption Threat,” BBC News, March 16, 2005.
22 Phyllis Bennis, “The Iraqi Constitution: A Referendum for Disaster,” Institute for Policy Studies,
October 14, 2005 http://www.ips-dc.org/comment/Bennis/tp34constitution.htm
23 Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National
Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–72
24 Excellent early country case studies illustrating each can be found in Alan Gelb and Associates, Oil Windfalls:
Blessing or Curse? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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police and keep opposition forces out. While repression may be a major
factor in the political area, it is not necessarily a factor in the economic
realm. Oil rich governments often do not have a major incentive to
develop non-oil sources of wealth. Nor do they have a pressing need to
raise revenues through taxes, and the ruled (but untaxed) consequently
have little incentive to hold their rulers accountable.
The rent seeking argument sees oil wealth as spoils for those who seize
and retain power. This will stimulate greed-driven rebellions as contrasted
to scarcity-driven rebellion. The government programs more often than
not focus on distribution rather than production.
Summing up the problems for economic development posed by an
abundance of natural resources, Nancy Birdsall notes:25
The curse of being blessed with natural resources is a problem not just in Chad
but in Bolivia, Venezuela and Nigeria. The evidence is overwhelming that oil
and mineral wealth hurts growth in developing countries. It generates more cor-
ruption than good jobs, and it undermines the development of property rights,
responsive local government and the other political institutions that a success-
ful economy requires.
Prevention of these effects in Iraq could take several approaches or their
combination:
Privatization—completely separate the government from the oil sector.
This action was originally proposed by MIT economist M. A. Adelman26
who recommended the auctioning of Iraq’s producing oil reserves, which
he estimated were worth around $100 billion, to the highest bidder. The
authorities would then be forced to institute a comprehensive tax system
to fund its operations. He did not, however, address the question of how
the government would spend the money after it comes in. Given the cur-
rent political climate in Iraq, combined with suspicion of U.S. motives for
that country, the window has been missed for this alternative.
Disbursement—automatically allocate a fixed share of oil revenues for
transfers to the population at large.
Transparency—if the government retains control of oil revenues, rules
and procedures must be established to assure full transparency and
accountability as the oil revenues flow through the system.
25 Nancy Birdsall, “Beating the ‘Curse’ of Natural Riches,” Los Angeles Times, January 2, 2006, B.9.
26 M. A. Adelman, “Let’s See Auction: Iraq’s Oil—For Sale to the Highest Bidder,” Wall Street Journal, April 2,
2003.
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Many other variants are possible. The World Bank’s recipe for sustain-
able development based on resource extraction requires three principles
at the national level: (1) the establishment of transparency and accounta-
bility with respect to revenues earned and their disposition; (2) consulta-
tion with principal stakeholders in developing plans for the use of resource
revenues; and (3) credible oversight and audit of the implementation of
these plans.27
These principles, reiterated by G8 members at the 2003 Sea Island
Summit and underpinning international efforts such as the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative,28 can be embedded in the very struc-
ture of an Iraqi government founded on checks and balances including
parliamentary oversight and on local consultation to prevent interregional
rivalries and conflicts between the central and local governments.29
Other solutions to the “oil curse” have been advanced. Reminiscent of
the “rules vs. authorities” debates30 in macroeconomics, one promising
direction of policy assumes that increased transparency, together with the
minimizing of the discretionary power governments have to spend, will
enable countries to avoid, or at least minimize somewhat, the three main
areas of difficulty noted above. This approach draws on the potential
effectiveness of oil funds in assisting countries overcoming aspects of the
three causal mechanisms noted above.
Oil funds
Oil funds have become fashionable in the wake of recent high and volatile
oil prices and new discoveries. In recent years, many countries have either
established oil funds or are considering doing so. These funds have differ-
ent rules and names, but their objectives are the same: to help govern-
ments deal with the problems created by large oil revenues.31
27 World Bank, “Oil and Gas Sector Issues and Policy: Social and Economic Impact,” available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ogmc/wbogpolicysocioeconomic.htm.
28 For more information on EITI, see http://www.eitransparency.org. For more on the G-8’s position on good
governance of natural resource revenues, see “Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency—A G8 Action
Plan” available at http://tinyurl.com/dbo62
29 Protecting the Future: Constitutional Safeguards for Iraq’s Oil: An Iraq Revenue Watch Report, May 2005.
30 Cf. Bennett T. McCallum, “The Case for Rules in the Conduct of Monetary Policy: A Concrete Example,”
Economic Review, September/October 1987.
31 Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel and Steven Barnett, “Oil Funds: Problems Posing as
Solutions?” Finance & Development, 38:4 (December 2001).
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Over the last ten or fifteen years, at least three types of oil funds have
been introduced. Stabilization funds are used to smooth-out government
expenditures over an oil cycle: in principle, when oil prices are high, rev-
enues are set aside; when prices fall, governments use the funds to main-
tain aggregate demand. A related idea is to use an oil fund to invest a large
proportion of revenues in international markets. In theory, such funds
would not only help spread the wealth over several generations but would
also help avoid appreciation of the local currency and the resulting harm
imposed on the non-oil export sectors of the economy—the so called
“Dutch Disease.”32 Finally, in line with the philosophy that ultimately oil
resources belong to the public, distribution funds disburse a certain
amount of oil revenues directly to the population at large.33
While oil funds seem at first glance an attractive option, from an eco-
nomic perspective they receive much less interest. Any fiscal policy deci-
sion that can be made in the context of an oil fund—any particular
decision about the use of oil revenue over time—can also be made with-
out an oil fund. Similarly, an oil fund is not required for a government to
save oil-related revenues abroad thereby preventing exchange rate pres-
sures from these revenues and easing the task of the monetary authorities.
The rationale for the creation of an oil fund must thus be based on politi-
cal economy arguments rather than on purely economic grounds.34
Clearly, natural resources and oil wealth should be of benefit to coun-
tries. The fact that they often are not can be linked to failures of gover-
nance that are connected with failures of democracy and public
accountability. An important contribution of an oil revenue investment/
distribution fund is that it may significantly remedy this political failure by
creating a sense of citizen ownership, in turn prompting buy-in to the
political system.35
To date, the results of oil fund based strategies in other countries have
been mixed. At issue is whether one or more variants of established and/or
proposed oil funds hold out promise for success in the Iraqi environment.
32 Robert Looney, “A Monetary/Exchange Rate Strategy for the Reconstruction of Iraq,” Middle East Policy 10:3
(Fall 2003), pp. 33–42.
33 “The Paradox of Plenty,” The Economist, December 20, 2005.
34 John Wakeman-Linn, Paul Mathieu and Bert van Selm, “Oil Funds and Revenue Management in Transition
Economies: The Cases of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan” (IMF). 
35 Thomas I. Palley, “Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Distribution Funds: Oil
and the Case of Iraq,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Special Report, December 2003.
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Stabilization funds
As their name suggests, stabilization funds are intended to shield the
economy from the negative effects of volatility due to variations in gov-
ernment revenues. Ideally, through transferring resources to the stabiliza-
tion fund the government is able to improve overall fiscal discipline.
Stabilization funds usually use pre-announced accumulation and with-
drawal rules that are contingent on the natural resource price or revenue
levels.
The fund accumulates a portion of natural resource revenues when
prices exceed a pre-announced threshold level; it releases assets to finance
government expenditures when prices are below a threshold level. The
thresholds may be defined in a number of ways, including arbitrarily set-
ting the value of natural resource price or revenues as a formula-calculated
value based on historical natural resource prices or revenues sometimes
including price/revenue projections.36
Performance of stabilization funds has been mixed. Chile’s Copper fund
operates as a stabilization fund; transfers go directly into the budget and
the elected legislature decides how to allocate funds through the budget-
ary process. Venezuela, on the other hand, has had much less success with
its stabilization fund because its ultra-presidential system allows the exec-
utive to allocate transfers from the fund without meaningful legislative
oversight.37
Another example of potential abuse of stabilization funds comes from
Chad. That country passed a revenue management law for its anticipated
oil proceeds from the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project. Although the law
requires 80 percent of the government’s oil revenues be dedicated to edu-
cation, health, infrastructure and other development projects, the law does
not specify where the funds should be spent. In other words, all the invest-
ments could be made in one region. In Chad, as in Iraq, where ethnic
cleavages coincide with geography, inequitable spending could reignite
Chad’s long running war.38
Chad illustrates another important lesson: If Iraq decides to create an oil
fund, the best way to ensure its stability would be to create it in the coun-
try’s constitution, thus protecting it from future political pressures. In late
36 Christian Petersen and Nina Budina, Governance Framework for Oil Funds: The Case of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan (Washington: World Bank, 2002).
37 Cf. Svetlana Tsalik, Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? (Open Society Institute, 2003).
38 Ibid.
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2005, the Chadian parliament voted to scrap a fund set up to safeguard a
portion of the country’s oil revenues for future generations. It also modi-
fied the fund noted above to include state security expenditures. In addi-
tion, the Parliament modified the terms of service from three years to nine
years of a special group whose task it is to monitor the operation of the
funds. These developments led Gilbert Maoundonodji, head of a civil
society coalition monitoring the oil funds, to note: “These changes mean
more bad governance and more unchecked corruption.”39
Governance issues aside, the main problems with stabilization funds
occur in designing rules for accumulation and transfer to the current
budget. The international price of oil does not appear to have a constant
average, or at least one to which it reverts to in a reasonable period of
time.40 In the period 1970–1980 the real price of oil rose by about 1,300
percent. From 1986, it dropped by about two thirds. It was fairly steady in
1986–1997, fell further in 1997–1998, and then more than tripled after
February 1999.
A major problem in setting a price of oil for stabilization fund purposes
is that speculation is a major factor in affecting prices. It is likely that spec-
ulation affects cartel prices more than competitive prices.41 Oil prices fluc-
tuate more because betting on price must include calculations about not
just supply and demand, but also about OPEC’s quota decisions, plus the
likelihood of member cheating on agreements and other elements of car-
tel behavior not easily gauged. Buyer panic is also another factor affecting
prices. In the huge oil price spike of late, the change in supply was almost
trivial, yet the price effects were massive. Hence the world oil market is
less predictable, more volatile than most markets. The result is that it is
extremely difficult to say with confidence that oil prices will fall or rise in
the future or that a price change is permanent or temporary. Stabilization
funds governed by rules that assume otherwise face either continuous
accumulation or rapid exhaustion of resources.42
39 “Chad: Parliament Defies World Bank, Scraps ‘Future Generations’ Oil Fund,” IRIN news.org, December
30, 2005. 
40 Jeremy Grantham, “Oil Defies Natural Process of Markets Reverting to the Mean,” Financial Times, July 21,
2005.
41 M. A. Adelman, “The Real Oil Problem,” Regulation, Spring 2004, p. 20.
42 Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel, and Steven Barnett, “Stabilization and Savings Funds for
Nonrenewable Resources: Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications,” IMF Occasional Paper 205 (Washington:
International Monetary Fund, April 13, 2001).
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The way oil prices behave helps explain why many domestic and inter-
national commodity price stabilization schemes collapsed or were termi-
nated in the 1980s and 1990s. Given the uncertain state of affairs in Iraq,
the problems associated with setting rules for a stabilization fund would be
compounded many times over: Should the fund’s rules be set by prices or
revenues? How would fluctuations in production stemming from insur-
gent attacks be handled? Should fluctuations in foreign assistance also be
included? One can easily think of additional elements that might make
any set rule designed by Iraqi authorities obsolete in a matter of months.
Inter-generational funds
Several leading economists43 have proposed that an inter-generational
fund along the lines of Alaska’s would facilitate Iraq’s economic recovery
while avoiding many of the difficulties associated with an oil-based
economy.
In the 1970s during the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the
state realized that the new oil leases would produce an enormous windfall.
Its citizens set up the Alaska Permanent Fund to manage this income,
directing that the revenue be invested, the principal remain untouched
and the gains be used for state infrastructure investments. Part of the pro-
ceeds was to be distributed as dividends to every Alaskan.
The Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) was created by an amendment to
the state constitution and enacted through a popular referendum. Public
oversight and an engaged citizenry have resulted in wise investment deci-
sions, and consequently the fund has remained financially strong.44
No doubt the stability of the APF is due largely to its status as a consti-
tutional amendment. In contrast, the Alberta Heritage Savings Fund
(AHSF) in Canada was created through the normal legislative process. As
a result, the AHSF’s management structure, investment rules and organi-
zation are subject to the ups and downs of the political process. The dif-
ferent strategies and priorities of the AHSF and the APF have resulted in
significant earnings discrepancies. While the AHSF has declined in value
over the last 15 years, the APF has had a real rate of return of over 12 per-
cent for the same period.45
43 See for example Vernon Smith, “The Iraqi People’s Fund,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2003, and
Steven C. Clemons, “Sharing Alaska-Style,” New York Times, April 9, 2003, A.19.
44 Tsalik, op. cit.
45 Ibid.
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Clemons has proposed that a fund similar to the Alaska fund be set up
in Iraq. The proposal is that Iraq should save a fixed portion of its oil rev-
enues, which would be invested in a portfolio of international equities and
bonds. This portfolio would effectively become the national trust fund
and the fund’s income would be distributed to Iraqi citizens on an annual
basis. Over time, the fund would grow as a result of continuing saving of
part of oil revenues, and so too would the dividend distribution.
Most of those advocating a similar fund for Iraq would tend to agree
with Clemons’ observation that in its significance the fund goes somewhat
beyond a simple widespread inter-temporal sharing of the country’s oil
wealth:
Most revolutions that produce democracies expand the number of stakeholders
in the nation’s economy. America’s occupation of Japan succeeded not just
because the United States purged Japan’s warmongers and established a peace
constitution but because it imposed land reform. American occupiers broke up
vast estates held by the Japanese aristocracy and redistributed the land to farm-
ers, thus linking Japan’s most lucrative resource to millions of citizens. Now
America should do the same with Iraq’s most lucrative resource oil.46
When Clemons first proposed an Alaska-type fund for Iraq in April of
2003, the country’s annual oil revenues were anticipated to come to
approximately $20 billion. With that figure he calculated that a postwar
government could invest $12 billion a year in infrastructure to rebuild the
nation. The other $8 billion could anchor an Iraq Permanent Fund to be
invested in a diverse set of international equities. The resulting income
would go directly to Iraq’s six million households. These payments would
make a huge difference to families in a country whose per capita gross
domestic product rests at about $2,500. More importantly, Clemons felt
that by spreading capital broadly among new stakeholders, the plan would
also prevent a sliver of Iraq’s elite from becoming a new kleptocracy.
In sum, with oil revenues constituting a large portion of the economy—
as much as 74% of GDP in the case of Iraq—channeling them through
government means that effectively the government runs the economy.
Not only does government have too large a say over economic activity, it
also becomes the target for corruption and rent-seeking.
46 Steven C. Clemons, “Sharing Alaska-Style,” New York Times, April 9, 2003, A.19
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Clearly, the establishment of an Alaska-type fund in Iraq might have the
potential to change the structure of the economy and incentives in ways
that could facilitate lasting economic and political change. Not only could
it diminish the natural resource curse with its risk of stagnation and civil
conflict, it would likely institute affirmative changes that (1) empower cit-
izens to take charge of the process of economic growth, and (2) give citi-
zens an incentive to engage in democratic politics.47
It is safe to assume that the extent to which these last two factors might
play a significant role in shaping Iraq’s future depend in part on the direct
distribution formula—how oil-related money is disbursed directly to the
country’s citizens.
Direct distribution funds
The Alaska fund was established in a state with a high level of good gov-
ernance. The gradual accumulation of revenues has over the past 25 years
built up the Alaska portfolio, and as the portfolio has grown so too has the
dividend distribution. This has had the intended effect of provision for the
future and building citizen ownership and engagement. However,
whereas the slow process of accumulation was right for Alaska, it may not
be right for Iraq, which starts from a condition of economic collapse and
with a history of autocratic, kleptocratic governance. Thomas Palley48 for
one has argued that the country’s current needs are so pressing that a sig-
nificant share of oil revenues should be disbursed to the population imme-
diately rather than being invested for future generations. His tentative
figure was that 25% of revenues be distributed, although his figure is
amenable to change.
In addition, Palley proposes the establishment of a companion fund that
would distribute a share of oil revenues to provincial and local govern-
ments. This second fund is intended to ensure a fair regional distribution
of revenues, thereby reducing the potential for regional grievances, which,
as noted, have led to civil war in several countries and certainly could lead
to one in Iraq.
At first glance, Palley’s proposal would seem unrealistic given the coun-
try’s financial plight. The United States is unlikely to authorize an increase
47 Thomas I. Palley, “Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Distribution Funds: Oil
and the Case of Iraq,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Special Report, December 2003.
48 Ibid.
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in the $18 billion it has already set aside for Iraq. At the end of 2005, half
of this had been distributed. The remainder will take perhaps another 18
months to spend, and then Iraq will presumably be on its own. As the
commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Iraq, General William
McCoy, noted: “We were never intending to rebuild Iraq. We were pro-
viding enough funds to jump-start the reconstruction effort in this coun-
try.”49 Other observers have severe doubts as to how the country will be
able to complete its reconstruction efforts:
With the world’s third-largest oil reserves, Iraq ought to be able to pay its own
way…But with oil revenues accounting for more than 90 percent of govern-
ment revenues (there is no tax system to speak of) and output still below pre-
war levels, there are profound fears about how Iraq will cope.50
Rough pictures of the harsh environment facing the Iraqis are contained
in the country’s National Development Strategy. As the NDS notes,
Saddam Hussein’s economic legacy will be present for some time. In par-
ticular, that regime’s questionable economic policies, its mismanagement
of the economy together with political repression, internal conflicts, wars
and sanctions have left a number of serious impediments to recovery and
growth. While some of these obstacles are lessening thanks to the
reforms51 put in place by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), others
were created or reinforced through postwar policy errors and miscalcula-
tions,52 and a number remain:53
1. The oil sector dominates the economy, accounting for around 74% of
GDP. Iraq now depends solely on oil exports for finance of investment
and consumption expenditures, for government revenues—of which oil
export proceeds exceed 93%—and for 98% of foreign currency earnings.
2. Centralized decision making and intrusion of the state into economic
life have distorted the pricing structure in many sectors to the extent
that prices often do not reflect the real value of the product or service.
In turn, distorted prices have caused inefficiencies and waste.
49 “Iraq’s Reconstruction Funding Drying Up,” United Press International, January 15, 2006.
50 Heather Steward, “Iraq’s Future Still Going Up in Smoke,” The Observer (London) January 15, 2006.
51 Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: the Neoliberal Model and its Role,” Middle East Journal 57:4
(Autumn, 2003), pp. 568–587.
52 Documented in Robert Looney, “The Viability of Shock Therapy in Iraq,” Challenge, 47:5
(September–October 2004), pp. 86–103.
53 The Iraqi Strategic Review Board, National Development Strategy 2005–2007 (Baghdad: The Ministerial
Committee on The National Development Strategy, September 2004), pp. 3–4.
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3. The public sector is over represented in the economy, leading to inef-
ficiency and decreased growth. Many state enterprises (SOEs) are cur-
rently dormant. The weakness of the private sector has limited its role
in economic development, increasing the lack of diversification.
4. Social inequalities are widespread in a broad range of fields covering
health, education, public services, and social services to low-income
groups, the disabled, internally displaced persons, refugees, single-
parent households, and other vulnerable groups, across geographic
areas.
5. With over 50% of the population under 24 years of age, rapid rates of
population growth are likely for many years. Many in this large demo-
graphic group are alienated due to violence and limited access to edu-
cation, training and career prospects.
6. There is widespread unemployment, ranging to about 50% and
absolute poverty where more than 60% of the population depends on
the government’s rationed food basket. Unemployment has led to an
increase in demands for social assistance.
7. Poor governance practices are common, including widespread nepo-
tism in public appointments and corruption among public servants.
The lack of accountability and transparency in managing state
resources has abetted corruption and increased its corrosive effect on
growth and efficiency.
8. Iraq’s decades long isolation has resulted in the digital divide, out-
dated institutions, administrative systems and know-how.
Technological stagnation and the use of outmoded production meth-
ods have weakened the economy as a whole.
9. Public sector institutions have witnessed serious looting, theft and
destruction.
10. Another legacy of the past was the total dependence on monetary
expansion to finance the deficit in the budget, which led to average
inflation of 50% annually during the 1990s. While monetary policy is
now on a sounder footing, the inflation psychology, lack of a devel-
oped government bond market, together with supply side shocks have
resulted in volatile movements in price and an inflation rate still in
double digits.
11. The traditional family unit and the community have remained the
core of Iraqi society, ensuring solidarity and social cohesion against all
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odds. However, conflict and inequality have eroded the social fabric of
communities and families throughout the past three decades.
12. In Iraq, social capital establishes an important relation between
incomes and human capability to withstand shocks. Iraqis have wit-
nessed a depletion of social capital, which has led to social deprivation
in most sectors of society.
13. Civic participation and recognition of human rights were denied dur-
ing the previous regime. They remain poorly understood and lack
ancillary support structures.
14. A large informal economy coexists with the formal sector. This infor-
mal economy may account for as much as 65% of Gross Domestic
Product.54 Even more worrisome is the large criminal element that
controls large segments of the informal sector.55
A recent UNDP household survey56 documents the impact these factors
are having on the average Iraqi household:
1. The UNDP survey suggests the poorest 20% of the population earns
7% of the income, while the top 20% earns 44%.
2. Iraq’s median household income of 144 dollars has dropped from a post-
war high of 255 dollars in 2003.
3. One-third of Iraqis canvassed by UNDP described themselves as being
among the poor.
4. One-sixth of interviewees met all or most of the criteria suggesting that
they lived beneath the poverty line.
The International Monetary Fund’s assessment57 of the Iraqi economy
stresses the difficulty of implanting policies in that country especially in
light of the constraints imposed by the new, fragile and very incomplete
institutional setting,58 the public sector’s limited administrative capacity
and the precarious social, political and security situation.
54 Robert Looney, “The Economics of Coping: The Plight of Women in Iraq’s Informal Economy,” Journal of
Social, Political and Economic Studies 30:3 (Fall 2005), pp. 285–303.
55 Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National
Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–72.
56 United Nations Development Program, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, Volume I: Tabulation Report
(Baghdad: Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation, 2005).
57 Statement by A. Shakour Shaalan, Executive Director for Iraq, August 1, 2005 in Staff Report for the 2005
Article IV Consultation, Supplementary Information (Washington: IMF, July 25, 2005).
58 Cf. Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: the Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National
Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–72.
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Distribution fund based development strategy
How did this sad state of affairs come about? Needless to say there is no
simple and short answer. In retrospect, starting with the adoption of a
questionable development, a vicious circle seems (Figure 1) to have pre-
vented the economy from gaining any sort of traction. Specifically:
1. Given the postwar state of affairs in Iraq, adoption of a neoliberal/
Washington Consensus free market development strategy was unreal-
istic.59 While an ideal policy mix in certain situations, as applied in Iraq
it has gone down a number of dead-ends as a result of serious miscal-
culations and faulty assumptions.
2. By its nature, this strategy largely precludes large segments of the pop-
ulation from the decision making process; only those with the prereq-
uisites—the proper education, appropriate skills, financial capital to
draw on, etc.—can immediately thrive. Few of these skills or assets
exist in today’s Iraq.
3. Its main strength is in providing incentives to private investors, but in
a conflict country like Iraq this is not enough to offset the high level
of uncertainty. As Stephen Glain has observed, “In the relatively
peaceful months that followed Saddam’s removal, it seemed Iraq
would no longer need Jordan as an enclave. Two years later, the colony
of affluent Iraqis in Amman is a measure of how estranged war-torn
Iraq has become from its private sector.”60 Even in Chile, its main suc-
cess story, several years of difficult restructuring under a very stable
government occurred before investors felt confident in taking a stake
in the country’s future.
4. While many have argued that a trade oriented development strategy
might provide added incentives for the private sector, shifting inter-
national markets and trade relationships might create added instabil-
ity through sudden drops in the output from industries with limited
domestic markets. Also, it appears that reforms in the trade area for
59 For a detailed description and assessment of the neoliberal reform package in Iraq see: Robert Looney, “The
Neoliberal Model’s Planned Role in Iraq’s Economic Transformation,” Middle East Journal (Autumn, 2003);
Robert Looney, “The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq,” Challenge, 47:5 (September–October 2004);
and Robert Looney, “Postwar Iraq’s Financial System,” Middle East Policy, XII:1 (Spring 2005).
60 Stephen Glain, “Land of Tycoons: Many Iraqi Businessmen are Running their Emires form Self Exile in
Jordan,” Newsweek (International Edition) June 27, 2005, p. 46.
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countries at Iraq’s stage of development are not particularly effective
in inducing follow-on reforms in key areas of governance.61
5. The neoliberal approach is not evolutionary: when things begin to go
wrong, there is not an automatic adaptive policy. In mature economies,
this adaptation is usually through price movements, but in a country
coming out of war, sanctions and a long history of socialism, a period
of institution creation and strengthening is necessary before markets
can be expected to perform this function.
6. As in other parts of the world, the neoliberal program is an easy target





































































Figure 1: Iraq—vicious circle of retarded reconstruction and insurgent activity
61 Robert Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic Policy: Are Trade Based Initiatives an Effective Tool in the War
on Terrorism?” Strategic Insights IV:1 (January 2005).
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sense, its stress on openness to trade and foreign investment make it
an easy target for arguments contending that the program is just
another form of imperialism—a program largely designed for exploita-
tion of weaker countries and groups. The extreme form of neoliberal-
ism introduced in Iraq lends considerable credibility to these claims,
as does the initial stress on privatization.
7. The neoliberal philosophy also discourages large-scale government
intervention in the economy. This, together with market instability,
creates high levels of uncertainty and the impression that the govern-
ment is powerless to respond to crisis or adversity. As a result, unem-
ployment has stabilized in the 30%–40% range, with large segments of
the Iraqi population having a sense of hopelessness concerning their
futures.
8. The insurgency aside, it is problematical whether the neoliberal
reforms would have jumpstarted the economy. A large show economy
exists, perhaps accounting for 65% of Gross National Product and 80%
of the labor force. This market is largely outside the normal forces of
supply and demand, requiring specific and directed policies to assure
its transition into the regular economy.
9. Transition economies with large shadow economies, but much more
favorable initial conditions, experienced sharp contractions for up to
five years after introducing even milder reforms. Even under normal
circumstances, this would have been the likely scenario for Iraq.
10. While one intent of the reforms was to dismantle as quickly as possi-
ble institutions linked to the previous regime, the neoliberal policies
were not, as expected, capable of initiating a process of new institu-
tional development. The resulting vacuum was largely filled by
already organized groups: religious, criminal and radical elements.
11. Because the neoliberal reforms were only partially introduced, with a
number of controls still in effect, significant and sizeable black mar-
kets have developed—the most important being in petroleum prod-
ucts. The resulting scarcity of fuels has had a debilitating effect on
several important sectors of the economy. It has also lent credibility to
extremist claims that the Coalition is only there to appropriate Iraqi
oil.
12. In effect, the economic system to date has been much more efficient
at creating an environment for criminals and extremist elements to
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thrive than it has for private investors. Much of the funding for
extremist groups comes from black market arbitrage, further enabling
their recruitment efforts.
In sum, the current development strategy with its emphasis on market
reforms, infrastructure development and private foreign investment is not
working and is not likely to revive the economy in the foreseeable future.
It is an export-oriented strategy, but other than oil, the country currently
has limited potential in this area. Nor, under the current circumstances
marked by violence and uncertainly, is it likely to be competitive in inter-
national markets for some time.
As a result, the massive expenditures in infrastructure have not pro-
duced the significant follow-on investment as Hirschman’s62 unbalanced
growth strategy might have anticipated. Instead, infrastructure projects
have been an easy target for the insurgents and a financial drain for the
United States and the Iraqi government. The top-down nature of the post-
war strategy is another reason for its limited impact. There has been lim-
ited Iraqi input and participation and, consequently, many of the
investments undertaken are not nearly as productive in the Iraqi context
as they would have been if they were indigenously designed to respond to
a tangible domestic need.
The value of a distribution fund along the lines suggested above is that
it has the potential, through reorienting the economy from the foreign
investment/export orientation to that of developing the domestic market,
to enable the economy to break out of the vicious circle of high unem-
ployment, increased violence, insignificant private investment, low
incomes, high unemployment. Moreover, it is likely that through divert-
ing funds from the public to the private sector it will provide, in addition
to the benefits of the Alaska-type funds noted above, an improved overall
policy environment. As Palley notes:63
Moreover, government may lack the capacity to effectively absorb and dispense
these revenues in a welfare maximizing fashion. Under such conditions shifting
toward decentralized absorption is desirable. This can be done by distributing
oil wealth to the people and letting them spend it on what they deem is needed
for their welfare. Economic development surely involves the accumulation of
pubic capital and infrastructure, and this requires government investment. But
62 Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).
63 Thomas I. Palley, “Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Distribution Funds: Oil
and the Case of Iraq,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Special Report, December 2003, p.9.
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economic development also requires the accumulation of private capital based
on the decentralized decisions of individuals. Putting extra money into the
hands of individuals can help this process.
The logical argument against an oil distribution fund with a large share
of oil revenues dispensed directly to the public is whether the country can
afford such a program. As we have seen, the reconstruction costs in Iraq are
enormous, and with the United States severely limiting its expenditures
in Iraq, there will be a large funding shortfall.
Here it is important to note that the so-called funding shortfall is a con-
trived number. It is based on the assumption that funds are being diverted
from projects with maximum impact and/or rates of return to activities of
little economic importance. Given the high costs of these projects due to
security costs, foreign staffing and the like, together with the limited effec-
tiveness of many, this shortfall is largely illusionary.
In any case, the true test of the expenditure of scarce resources in Iraq
should be the total contribution to political and economic development.
Expenditure patterns that contribute to the avoidance of the resource
curse are likely to be the most productive for the country’s eventual recov-
ery and growth. An oil distribution fund is the best way to ensure that out-
come. It stands to raise political engagement and improve democracy,
reduce government corruption, and reduce the likelihood of civil conflict
by diminishing cause for regional grievance. An oil distribution fund also
promises to accelerate private sector economic development through a
process of demand led growth. And, as the supply side of the economy
grows this can provide the tax base needed to fund public infrastructure.64
Finally, one area of investment critical to the country’s future is the oil
sector. Iraqi goals for the sector are to triple current production levels
within ten years at an estimated investment cost of $20 billion.65 Clearly
much of this will have to be foreign investment or financed through bor-
rowing. Iraqi oil in the ground can be used as collateral for such borrowing,
but this should still leave current oil revenues free for distribution. Thus,
investment in the oil industry if appropriately financed is not inconsistent
with the creation of an oil distribution fund of the magnitudes outlined
above.
64 Palley, op.cit.
65 “Iraqis Ponder How to Manage their Oil Wealth,” Noozz.com, October 1, 2005.
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Assessment
Summing up, in addition to the obvious popularity of a direct distribution
fund, its great strength lies in the prospect of the establishment of a virtu-
ous circle of demand-led growth (Figure 2), as opposed to the current eco-
nomic malaise or even vicious circle noted above. Most importantly, by
breaking the direct link between oil and the government, it holds out the
distinct prospect of enabling Iraq to avoid the oil curse that has plagued so
many resource-rich developing countries.66 In addition, there would be
many tangible benefits associated with a disbursal program of this type,
each of which can play an important role in the country’s recovery:




































66 A similar view can be found in Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, “Saving Iraq From Its Oil,” Foreign
Affairs 83:4 (July/August) 2004.
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1. The Iraqi people would have increased incentive to protect the coun-
try’s oil facilities by providing intelligence on insurgent groups
attempting to disrupt the production and flow of oil.67
2. It might even help stem the insurgency, especially if much of that
activity is driven by Sunni fears that they will receive considerably less
that their accustomed amount under the new Constitution.
3. Men and women would receive equal distributions.
4. It would establish an irrevocable personal identity under the law—
essential for establishing titled property rights, bank accounts, human
rights protection, voter lists and taxpayer lists.
5. It would expand banking and credit access for small and medium
sized businesses.
6. It could help offset pubic resistance to gas price increases which will
be needed to cut back oil smuggling. A related benefit is that it would
also greatly help the government cut back on gas subsidies which cur-
rently amount to billions of dollars a year.
7. Without equitable distribution of oil revenues, competition among
various groups for oil money could turn ugly and even erupt into vio-
lent conflict in Iraq. Rifts over oil revenues already run deep, as Iraqi
Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen struggle for control of oil-rich Kirkuk.68
8. Citizens eligible for fund payouts would have an incentive to monitor
the government and participate in the political process to guard the
value of their entitlement.
9. A related effect is that oil funds are likely to encourage efficiency in
the petroleum sector. Since the size of payments to citizens will
depend on the efficiency of the oil industry, this should contribute to
political pressure to improve efficiency.
10. Oil funds are expedient: rather than the long time intervals needed to
improve government accountability and anti-corruption drives, they
can be put in place immediately. They are doubly desirable when gov-
ernance is weak, and the need for institutions to handle oil revenues
is immediate.
67 Gordon O. F. Johnson, “Iraq’s Oil Revenues Should Empower the People,” speech, Heritage Foundation
June 3, 2004.
68 Protecting the Future: Constitutional Safeguards for Iraq’s Oil: An Iraq Revenue Watch Report, May 2005.
